The 8 PM ET deadline passed without a ceasefire. What follows is the first full revision since the Kharg Island strike, Security Council veto, Iranian 14M mobilization order, and Iran's direct strike on Saudi Arabia's Jubail petrochemical complex fundamentally restructured the board.
Outcome | Probability | Δ from Prior |
|---|---|---|
No ceasefire at deadline | 100% | ✓ Confirmed |
Ceasefire within 48 hours |
↓ from 22–30% |
Ceasefire within 2 weeks | 12–18% | ↓ from 45–52% |
Ceasefire within 30 days | 18–25% | New tier |
Pakistan mediation channel intact | 25–35% | ↓ from 50–58% |
In-person US-Iran talks (Islamabad) | 20–28% | ↓ from 50–58% |
Direct bilateral summit (Trump–Araqchi) | 8–15% | ↓ from 30–38% |
China-facilitated breakthrough | 10–18% | ↓ — Security Council veto exposed Beijing's limits |
Pope Leo XIV mediation success (30-day) | 12–20% | Only live diplomatic intervention |
Outcome | Probability | Δ from Prior |
|---|---|---|
Hormuz partial closure (current) | 45–55% | Baseline |
Hormuz full closure (14-day) | 62–72% | ↑ from 43–50% |
Maritime incident (US-Iran naval) | 50–60% | New entry |
Outcome | Probability | Notes |
|---|---|---|
AUMF passed (Congress) | 55–65% | ↑ — Jeffries "war of choice" warning signals Democratic resistance forming |
AUMF rejected or blocked | 35–45% | |
Wider Iranian civilian infrastructure campaign | 65–75% | Kharg sets the precedent |
Saudi/Gulf state direct retaliation on Iran | 40–50% | New — Iran hit Saudi Jubail; Riyadh now has skin in this |
Israeli front opening (simultaneous IDF strikes) | 20–30% | New — Netanyahu is actively lobbying Trump |
US ground operations initiated | 10–18% | Low but non-zero; 14M mobilization changes US calculus |
Outcome | Probability | Notes |
|---|---|---|
Oil price sustained above $150/bbl | 45–55% | ↑ — closure risk + Saudi Jubail hit compound supply anxiety |
Taiwan Strait incident (spillover) | 5–8% | Minimal — China is managing Iran, not opening a second front |
NATO Article 5 invoked | <2% | Near-zero under current scenario |
The Pope entry is the most analytically significant addition. Leo XIV is the only actor with simultaneous access to Trump and Tehran who hasn't been compromised by the past two weeks of strikes. His intervention doesn't raise ceasefire probability materially in the near term — but he is now the only off-ramp that doesn't require Pakistan to survive additional rounds of escalation intact.
The Saudi-Gulf tier is the new wild card. Before today, Gulf states were bystanders absorbing economic pain from Hormuz disruption. Iran's strike on Jubail changes their interest calculus. Riyadh did not sign up for a direct exchange with Tehran — if it now feels compelled to respond, the bilateral Iran-Gulf front adds a dimension the US-Pakistan mediation framework cannot absorb.
The AUMF fight is underrated in open-source commentary. Jeffries' "war of choice" framing is significant — it signals the Democratic caucus is looking for a legislative vehicle, not just a press release. If the AUMF stalls in the Senate, the legal basis for continued offensive operations becomes contested within days.
Full Day 13 Briefing outline — covering the escalation ladder, AUMF vs. war declaration question, Islamabad track survival assessment, China's next move, and oil market second-order effects — will follow tomorrow.
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Kharg, veto, mobilization, and Saudi Jubail strike force material downward revision across all diplomatic outcomes
Updated through April 7 post-deadline — full probability table revision, escalation threads, Pope mediation, Saudi front, AUMF fight